Mudania Peace Conference

August 5, 2011 By Leave a Comment

THE ALLIES ACT TOGETHER

ONE hopeful and satisfactory result of the conference of the Powers at Mudania is that the representatives of Great Britain and France agreed harmoniously upon the demands to be made from the Turkish Nationalist army as precedent to the proposed peace conference. If only France and Great Britain and Italy had come together in the same way a year ago in their general policy as to the Near Eastern situation, the world might have been saved the spectacle of political jealousy, lack of concord, and consequent flouting of the wishes of the great nations, all of which has resulted in the recent serious crisis.

Even before that crisis reached its climax it was evident that the victory of Kemal over Greece would be followed by large concessions to the Turkish Nationalist movement-concessions that will restore Turkish rule in Constantinople and will hand over to. Turkish control a large part of Thrace and the important city of Adrianople. If Kemal had been so ill advised as to attack the British forces at Chanak before reinforcements reached them from Malta and powerful British warships lined up in the Straits ready to shell the Turkish troops if they should advance, it would have been impossible to avoid hostilities on a large scale. The Chanak position is now almost impregnable, but for a few days it was in danger.

The conditions agreed upon by the representatives of the Powers at Mudania are to be submitted by Ismet Pasha, the Turkish delegate, to the Nationalist Government at Angora. If they are accepted, presumably the call will go forth for a peace conference without delay. A principal point involved is that the Greeks shall withdraw their forces from Eastern Thrace, and that the territory shall be occupied by Allied forces for one month in order to give Greek and other Christian civilians opportunity to move out if they wish.

This is not satisfactory to Greece; she has earnestly asked that the period of Allied occupation be set at two months, but it is understood that she will submit to the inevitable. Another condition is that the Turkish forces should withdraw from the neutral zone during the peace negotiations; during the Mudania conference it has been more than once reported that the Turks have made new invasions in the neutral zone and that one or more of these have been in the neighborhood of Istib, which is the natural approach to Constantinople. If this is so, the Nationalists have absolutely no excuse, as that zone was recognized by them long ago, which was not the case with the portion of the zone to the west and near Chanak.

During the two months, as proposed by the armistice conditions, a civil as well as a military administration will be set up in Thrace by the Allies, and it is hoped that thereby conflict between Turks and Greeks and consequent slaughter, burning, and reprisals by both parties will be avoided.

In any event, the Turk returns to Europe and is in every way in a better situation than he has been since the end of the first Balkan War. Whether he can be expected under these circumstances to respect the rights of the racial minorities and to keep down religious fanaticism is at least doubtful.

WHAT SHOULD AMERICA DO?

Rerun reports from the Near East give detailed accounts of the suffering and horrors of the occupation of Smyrna. The Turks assert that similar horrors and bloodshed accompanied the retreat of the Greeks from Anatolia, and it is probable that there is truth in this accusation also. There is urgent need for the practical sympathy of America in contributions for the sufferers. We may be proud of the assistance rendered immediately by Americans who were on the spot; for instance, one despatch states that the American naval ships “took out of Smyrna no less than 180,000 of the total 220,000 persons removed since the terrible fire which destroyed the city.”

Extensive efforts are being made in this country by the Near East Relief for the raising of funds, and many thousands of dollars have already been subscribed. The American Red Cross has announced its willingness to spend as much of its $20,000,000 surplus as is needed for relief in the Near East. Americans certainly may aid with heart and purse in this work of relief and restoration, regardless of their opinions as to international questions involved. It is said that over $100,000,000 has been spent by American educational, medical, and missionary associations in the Near East, and the extent of our moral responsibility is indicated by the eagerness of the American people to aid in the present juncture.

In an illuminating article in the New York “Tribune” Dr. A. L. P. Dennis points this out, shows also that our trade and commercial interests in the Near East are extensive, and discusses thoroughly the duty and limitations of the United States in the present situation. He suggests that America might reasonably ask for a limited participation in any Near Eastern conference, in accordance with the precedent set at the Armament Conference at Washington, where national representatives sat only in those conferences in which their countries had a direct interest. Our right to a voice in determining action affecting American property and interests is indubitable. Dr. Dennis names the American interests involved as notably the capitulations, the freedom of the Straits, the protection of our philanthropy and of our trade, and the status of Christian minorities. We have no concern with settling political questions in Europe or the Near East in themselves; and we have not even the right which we had at Paris while helping to settle the terms of peace, for we were not at war with Turkey. We have, however, interests to protect, and we ought to see that they are protected.

Source: The Outlook, 18 October 1922

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The Turk Who Didn’t Go

December 23, 2010 By Leave a Comment

FROM the moment when Turkey entered the World War on the side of Germany men in all the Entente countries and in America came to one conclusion: “The Turk must be put out of Europe.”

But he was not. True, his lands were lopped off both in Europe and in Asia. He was practically reduced to Asia Minor. It was hoped that his European days were over. But he still hung on in Constantinople, and his influence in the surrounding region continued to be felt.

There arose in Asia Minor one Mustapha Kemal, a man of singular ability and force. About him came Turks in great number, and an army was speedily organized and perfected. A civil government was set up at Angora, a town well situated to be the seat of government. Clever people were called to the administration.

The Kemalists began to negotiate with the Russian Bolshevik! and an arrangement was made, apparently of mutual benefit. On the other hand, the Kemalist Government managed to make an agreement with France. Tired of spending money without much result in the province or Cilicia, the French Government decided to withdraw and concentrate its endeavors in Syria. The arrangement made with the Kemalists provided for the protection of the native Christians in Cilicia, but very many of them, remembering the Adana massacres, placed no faith in such protection and proceeded to follow the French troops into Syria and to find new homes there. The French, it is rumored, even supplied the Kemalists with arms.

The result of the negotiations in Paris three years ago assured to the Greeks protection of the Greek-occupied territory of Smyrna and of the easternmost coast of Asia Minor. Acting upon this, King Constantine, on reassuming the throne, decided to clear the borderland of Turkish marauders; doubtless his object was quite as much to strengthen himself and his throne as it was to help the Greeks in Asia. After a long and varied war, the Greek troops have now not only been swept from the mountains but into the sea. Smyrna has been taken by the Turks, and the Kemalist troops, inspirited by success, are now disposed to march to the Bosphorus and take Constantinople, not only out of the hands of the reigning Sultan, but especially out of the hands of the British and others on guard there.

The question to-day here is: “What will the British do? And if they back up their words by their guns, will the French and Italians stand by and give co-operation?”

The question might be more easily answered if it were as simple as it sounds. It is, on the contrary, a deep problem. In the ultimate analysis, it embraces most of the unsettled questions of the peace settlement resulting from the World War.

Great Britain apparently holds a moral as well as a material advantage. Yet in one respect Great Britain is at a serious disadvantage. Any overt action against Mohammedanism would be instantly resented in India, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt, for, with all the pompous circumstance attending Egypt’s new-found freedom, that country still remains profoundly under British domination. France also might be at a disadvantage as she considers her Mohammedan subjects in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, and elsewhere; but her retiral from Cilicia has given high hopes to Mohammedans everywhere.

II

England and France are at one as to the necessity of keeping the freedom of the Straits-the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This is the second thing, as regards Turkey, that should result from the World War. The question is whether such freedom means a necessity to undertake military measures at this time. The defense of the Straits-no matter how much it may be the defense of the individual and selfish interests of England or France or Italy or Rumania or Bulgaria or any other Power-is really the defense of the general interests of all; the defense is necessary, not only for Europe, but even for lands, like our own, outside Europe.

In this whole matter Great Britain is of course the “biggest toad in the puddle,” as becomes her naval preponderance. This would be specially indicated if the Straits were not fortified, because, starting from Gibraltar and Malta, British preponderance would be easily seen. Hence there is much sentiment in Paris towards fortification.

Many Frenchmen also add that neither Great Britain nor France nor any other Power should be in control, but only the League of Nations. This might seem to involve the problem of the admission of Turkey to membership in the League; when it comes to this, my French friends seem a little embarrassed, although they profess that ultimate good will come out of it too. No one seems to place any reliance on statements purporting to emanate from Mustapha Kemal as to the freedom of the Straits and that he does not intend to undertake aggressive action against the Allies. He knows as well as does any other Turk that the real aggressive action against the Allies is to do precisely what is being done-namely, to stir up French jealousy of Great Britain. That inter-jealousy game has worked well for years and has been applied by the Sultans, in turn, to all the Powers in any way interested in Turkey. The “Sick Man” remains agreeably “sick” in Constantinople under those circumstances.

III

The third thing as regards Turkey that should have resulted from the World War is the giving of guaranties for the protection of the Christian minorities in Asia Minor. The Turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Greeks, and there is every reason to fear that his savagery will be continued. We have only to read the ghastly details of what has happened to Christian women and children in this very year; we have only to be informed that the Turkish army subalterns were seen setting fire to the Christian quarters in Smyrna to be sure of that.

What is now needed is some kind of concerted action into which there can be injected no element of disintegration. It is pleasant to know, therefore, that the French Government has instructed General Pelle, its High Commissioner at Constantinople, to concert plans with the English and Italian High Commissioners so that the Angora Government shall know beyond a doubt that the Allies are in accord at least as to maintaining the neutrality of the zone of the Straits. This can be done, the French maintain, without any military demonstration, and in a way to make the Kemalists realize that it is entirely in their interests to respect the decision of the Allies and not to undertake anything of an offensive nature.

The English doubt this, and the English Government has decided to reinforce both its fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and the British troops under Sir Charles Harington, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces at Constantinople. Not satisfied with this; England invites her Allies to do as much. She even asks Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Greece to participate in the effective defense. Finally, she asks her colonists to help the mother country. What Anzac can resist an appeal that carries with it the association of Gallipoli? The French shrug their shoulders at this. They fear, as I heard them say to-day, that “the Turks will see in it a certain menace.” Exactly what the Turks should see!

Again, the French, like the Italians, have a contempt for the Greeks and decline to “line up” with them. And-most remarkable in a nation of realists-the French actually pretend that the English are seeing a peril which does not yet exist. In this case, it is possible the English may be seeing better than the French.

Certainly Premier Lloyd George received a setback by the defeat of the Greek troops in Asia Minor. Perhaps, smarting under this, and with the prospect of general elections at home in the near future, he is making “a last desperate throw,” as his enemies claim, in the deep political game. But why go still further and call his defense of the freedom of the Straits a wanton war? That statement is hardly warranted. One thing is sure: the Germans eagerly acclaim any dissension in the Entente.

Source: The Outlook, 11 Oct 1922

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America and the Near East

December 21, 2010 By Leave a Comment

SECRETARY HUGHES has taken a firm and positive position as to the relations of the United States to the new Near Eastern problem. He declares that there is nothing to justify this country in any effort to pacify the Near East by armed force, or to attempt to bring political influence to bear on the international questions involved in which we have not been and are not concerned. On the other hand, our Government proposes to exert all influence possible for humanity, peace, and the protection of American interests. American warships have already aided effectively in the rescue work in Smyrna.

There has been an earnest but not altogether well-balanced effort by those interested in American benevolent and religious effort in the Near East urging our Government to take action. Dr. James Cannon, a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, urged the United States to use its Army and Navy. One newspaper statement, probably exaggerated, says that there have been demands from “hundreds of church organizations that this country fight, if necessary, to protect Christians from the Turk.”

The statement by Secretary Hughes was largely in answer to Bishop Cannon’s representations. Mr. Hughes declared that we have already done everything possible for relief and in aid to refugees and have exerted influence against cruelty and oppression and in aid of “the protection of the Christian minorities and the freedom of the Straits.” He says: “These points of the proposal are clearly in accordance with American sentiment.” A moderate statement from Dr. Barton, Secretary of the American Board, expresses his belief that, while conditions are serious, they are not alarming, that the Turks are on the whole favorable to American activities in Turkey, and that he does not think that there is reason to fear for the personal safety of our missionaries in Turkey.

Source: The Outlook, 11 Oct 1922

Filed Under: Government Tagged With: , , , ,

A Lull in the Near East

December 21, 2010 By Leave a Comment

REPRESENTATIVES of Great Britain, France, and Italy are, as we write, entering into conference with Mustapha Kemal at Mudania, an unimportant port on the Sea of Marmora. This conference is nominally of a military nature and aims to frame an armistice between Greece and the Nationalist forces of Turkey. The plan is that it should bo followed by a full peace conference at Venice or elsewhere, at which the political and international questions involved should be taken up for final decision. It is, however, probable that at Mudania other than purely military points will be taken up, for the reason that Kemal is still insistent on committal by the Powers to his demands, including his proposal that his army should at once occupy Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza River, and therefore including Adrianople.

In the week ending October 3, Kemal withdrew his troops from some important points in the neutral zone, and in other ways showed that he did not intend to attack the British position at Chanak. It seems obvious that if he ever intended to yield to the pressure of his soldiers to begin war at that point he would have done so at the first possible minute and before reinforcements in troops and naval ships strengthened the position as they have now done. His demonstrations in the neutral zone were largely intended to emphasize his declaration that he does not recognize the existence of such a zone on the Asian side, as his Nationalist Government has never had any part in establishing such a zone. The occupation by Kemal’s forces of Erenkeui looked like a serious threat because of its advantageous position for an attack on the little foothold of the British on the Asian coast.

Even now, however, Kemal’s reported statements are extreme in their demands. For instance, M. Bouillon, who has been trying to get reasonable terms from Kemal, reported on October 2 that Kemal would not even agree to suspend military movements during the armistice conference except on condition of receiving formal guaranties for the evacuation of Thrace, the establishment of Allied garrisons in the cities of Thrace, the occupation of the line of the Maritza River by Allied troops, the admission of Turkish Nationalist gendarmes into Thrace, the transfer of the civil administration of Thrace to Kemalist officials,and the evacuation of Thrace in eight days by the Greek army. These are matters that ought to be fixed by an armistice rather than conditions for it, and it seems overbearing in Kemal to make such conditions a prerequisite.

Source: The Outlook, 11 Oct 1922

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Greece and Peace

November 18, 2009 By

PEACE IS ARDENTLY DESIRED by the Greeks in their war with the Turks, but not peace at any price, nor is it to be expected that Athens will oblige France and the Turkish Nationalists by consenting to the unconditional abandonment of the Greeks of Asia. This we learn from the Greek correspondent of the London Times, who points out moreover, that no Greek Government would fail to demand compensation, territorial or financial, or both, for the loss of the Ionian mandate. The Greek case, as presented by a Greek of no pronounced party sympathies was outlined to this correspondent as follows:

“The Entente Powers gave the Ionian mandate to the Greek nation by the Treaty of Sevres. If they gave it not to the nation, but to Mr. Venizelos, they had no right to do so, and they can not blame us for accepting the gift as tho it had been made to the nation. We may have made a huge mistake in the last elections, but are they justified in abandoning us because our unreflecting electorate made an instinctive movement against what it regarded as a Dictatorship? If we are to evacuate the area which our unbeaten army holds, we have the right to demand compensation as well as guaranties that our commercial interests in Ionia will be respected, and, above all, that our ‘unredeemed brethren’ shall not suffer for having made common cause with us when the Powers invited us first to occupy Ionia, and then to take the offensive against the Kemalists who were threatening Constantinople.”

It is admitted that there are some Greeks who will not hear of the evacuation of Ionia on any terms, but the Times correspondent doubts whether such Greeks are truly representative of the majority. On the other hand he tells us that there is no tendency to accept any compromise on the question of Eastern Thrace. Of Greek relations with the Powers, this informant tells us:

“The fears exprest in some quarters last winter that the return of the Royalist Party to power would result in a pro-German orientation of Greek policy and a growth of pro-German sentiment among the Greek people have till now proved baseless. We British remain extremely popular with all parties, save the handful of Communists. As regards Greek relations with Italy, the Greek Government, tho it regrets the continuance of the Italian occupation of the purely Greek Dodecanese islands, is anxious to be on good terms with a powerful Western neighbor, and the Greek Press is now much less given to anti-Italian diatribes than was the case a year ago.

“French policy in the Near East is severely and often intemperately criticized by both Royalist and Venizelist newspapers, more especially since the Angora Treaty. While the Royalist organs, forgetting the painful incidents of December 1, 1916, seem unnecessarily surprized at the disinclination of the Quai d’Orsay to discuss the recognition of King Constantine, the Venizelists seem to stand on firmer ground when they criticize the very anti-Greek attitude of part of the French Press to-day.”

Bulgaria remains the bugaboo of Greece in the Balkans, we are told, for while its Premier, Stambuliski, inspires “some, but not unlimited confidence,” the Greek students of Balkan affairs wonder whether his Agrarian party will be able to retain its. independence of the Macedonian groups. We read then:

” Roumania is popular; the Greek Press advocates a policy of mutual understanding and cooperation between Athens and Bucharest, and the recent marriages between the Royal Houses are regarded as a proof of the good relations between the two states. There is little confidence in the vitality of the Albanian State and considerable soreness over the decision of the Entente Powers to award a large part of ‘Northern Epirus,’ which the Powers regarded as Greek in 1914, to the Government of Tirana.

” Greek relations with the Triune Kingdom of Jugo-Slavia seem decidedly friendly, and Belgrade has a very capable and popular representative at Athens in the person of Mr. Baloukchich; still Salonika may become a bone of contention between Greeks and Southern Slays in the future, and one can not help feeling that it might be good policy for Greece to make Salonika a free port and thus deprive Belgrade of possible economic grievances and restore the much-impaired prosperity of that historic Macedonian seaport.”

Source: The Literary Digest for February 18, 1922

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